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ABSTRACT
The concept of joint implementation as a way to implement climate change mitigation projects in another country has been controversial ever since its inception. Developing countries have raised numerous issues at the project-specific technical level, and broader concerns having to do with equity and burden sharing. This paper summarizes the findings of studies for Brazil, IndiM exico and South Afkica, four countries that have large greenhouse gas emissions and are heavily engaged in the debate on climate change projects under the Kyoto Protocol. The studies examine potential or current projects/programs to determine whether eight technical concerns about joint implementation can be adequately addressed. They conclude that about half the concerns were minor or well managed by project developers, but concerns about additionality of funds, host country institutions and guarantees of performance (including the issues of baselines and possible leakage) need much more effort to be adequately addressed. All the papers agree on the need to develop institutional arrangements for approving and monitoring such projects in each of the countries represented. The case studies illustrate that these projects have the potential to bring new technology, investment, employment and ancillary socioeconomic and environmental benefits to developing countries. These benefits are consistent with the goal of sustainable development in the four study countries. At a policy level, the studies' authors note that in their view, the Annex I countries should consider limits on the use of jointly implemented projects as a way to get credits against their own emissions at home, and stress the importance of industrialized countries developing new technologies that will benefit all countries. The authors also observe that if all countries accepted caps on their emissions (with a longer time period allowed for developing countries to do so) project-based GHG mitigation would be significantly facilitated by the improved private investment climate.
INTRODUCTION
In response to the increasing concern about global climate change, projects for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) by sources and for their removal by sinks are being implemented worldwide. These projects may be undertaken within a country seeking to reduce its own emissions, or in another country, in which case the resulting GHG emissions reductions can be shared by the participating countries. The concept of sharing emissions reductions originated in carbon offset projects, in which emissions in a developed (investor) country were offset through projects implemented in another (recipient or host) country where the reduction could be achieved at lower cost than in the investor country. These offset projects led to the inclusion of the concept of emissions reduction sharing, called joint implementation (JI), in Article 4.2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in 1992. In principle, JI entails fill or partial financial support from an investor country, which receives credits for some of the GHG emissions reduced by projects it undertakes in a recipient country.
The credits may eventually be used toward the investor country's emissions-reduction commitment under the FCCC and the subsequent Kyoto Protocol of December 1997.
Ever since its inclusion in the FCCC, JI has been controversial (Zollinger and Dower, 1996) .
Concerns are particularly strong regarding investments by Annex I (industrialized) countries in projects in non-Annex I (developing) countries (CNE 1994 , Andrasko et al. 1996 . Opponents have suggested that Annex I countries reduce their own emissions prior to resorting to JI projects, and raised technical concerns such as the transfer of obsolete technology and social concerns about the negative impacts on the local population.
In order to examine the validity of these concerns, authors from four developing countriesBrazil, India, Mexico and South Africa --examined their applicability to JI or potential JI projects/programs on a case-by-case basis. Four papers (Imaz et al. 1998 , LaRovere 1998 , Ravindranath et al. 1998 , and van Horen et al. 1998 were written using the same format and addressing the same basic set of issues for each case study (see Table 1 for the issues examined by each author). The 12 case studies included energy efficiency, renewable, bioenergy, and forestry projects. The primary conclusion is that most technical concerns about JI/AIJ were adequately addressed in the case studies, with a few exceptions : baselines and additionality, guarantees of performance, risk of leakage, permanence of forestry projects, and host country institutions to evaluate and monitor projects. In the next few sections, we provide background information on the current status and concerns about JI/AIJ, and then summarize the findings from the case studies. should only count toward a small fraction of their total emissions reduction commitments (Andrasko et al. 1996) . JI projects have also been viewed by some observers as a thinly veiled attempt by industrialized countries to maintain continued high standards of living at the expense of developing economies. Developing countries are also concerned that JI investors would take advantage of all the cheapest options to reduce emissions abroad, leaving recipient countries with only the most expensive options to pursue on their own in the fidure when developing country GHG emissions are likely to be capped (e.g., Ojwang and Karani, 1995; CNE, 1994; Andrasko et al., 1996) .
AIJ projects are designed to allow investors and "recipient countries to gain experience with project implementation, to help clari@ conceptual and methodological issues associated with projects, to identi~institutions to participate in future JI projects, and to learn about ways to reduce project transaction costs. No GHG emissions reductions credits are awarded from AIJ projects for transfer from one country to another to be used toward meeting FCCC commitments;
however, some AIJ projects have negotiated specific agreements for eventual credit sharing. The AIJ pilot phase is to be reviewed by the year 2000, as agreed at the first meeting in 1995 . regions that will contribute the bulk of fbture increases in greenhouse gas emissions, is indicative of the concern that governments on these developing continents have about JI/AIJ, and lack of investor interest in these regions.
The limited availability of tiding for AIJ projects in the absence of crediting is another important reason for the small number of projects so far (Michaelowa 1998) . Most Annex 1 countries, particularly the U. S., seek a strong role for the private sector in JI projects (Zollinger and Dower, 1996) . Among the objectives of the U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation (USIJI, the US government's JI program, begun in 1994 and now comprising 32 accepted projects in 14 countries) is to encourage private-sector investment in non-Annex I countries and to disseminate technologies to reduce GHG emissions or sequester carbon (USIJI, 1998). Currently, the private sector's primary incentives for undertaking AIJ projects are the opportunities to: (1) learn about implementing climate change projects in host countries, (2) minimize transaction costs, and (3) position individual companies for access to new markets as economies grow and environmental considerations become more widely addressed (Michaelowa and Greiner, 1996) . A small number of projects would suffice to fidfill these goals. The private sector is likely to have much more incentive to participate in emissions reduction investments in the post-Kyoto FCCC environment, depending upon whether the Kyoto protocol is ratified and implemented and the extent to which it encourages the evolution of a "mature" JI regime Each author examined the same set of issues and technical concerns with respect to selected case studies. Table 1 (Ojwang and Karani, 1995; Andrasko et al., 1996) describes the technical concerns addressed in the papers, and summarizes the authors' findings and Table 2 lists the 12 climate-change projects/programs that were selected by authors as case studies. The technical concerns that each author was asked to evaluate are listed in Table 1 , Column 1. There are some issues of particular concern to investors, such as the determination of baselines. Leakage and permanence are the other two issues, which can reduce or negate the carbon sequestered by forestry projects. The India and Mexico forestry studies, however, report on the link between local socioeconomic benefits, which can serve as a way to ensure the permanence of the carbon benefit. 
Description of Projects and Their Benefits
Each of the case studies listed in Table 2 is expected to result in economic, environmental and social benefits in addition to the reduction of greenhouse gases. In all cases, these projects would be worth pursuing for one or more of these benefits, although these benefits may still not guarantee that the project would have happened without JI/AIJ. The external investment will bring local benefits in terms of creating rural or urban jobs depending on the project location, reduced deforestation and/or emissions to air, and in the case of national programs, a significant reduction in oil imports. We describe the projects and their benefits by country below.
Brazil
Brazil has no AIJ projects, nor is there an assessment or government acceptance process in place.
However, several ongoing programs in Brazil, including the ethanol fuel program, could benefit horn JI/AIJ support. La Revere (1998) examines four types of projects that might be suitable for AIJ/JI in Brazil: forest conservation, ethanol fuel production, charcoal production from plantations, and energy conservation ( Table 2) 
India
Several candidate AIJ projects have been developed in India and submitted to the USIJI or Canadian AIJ programs; these include a dairy-cow methane emissions reduction project in Gujarat, a community agroforestry project in Karnat&a, an electric transmission line efllciency improvement project, several bioenergy projects, and a municipal solid waste project. Ravindranath, et al. (1998a) examine the JI/AIJ issues identified above for three bioenergy or afforestation projects: generating bioelectricity for rural power supply, agroforestry for raising fruit (tamarind) trees, and establishing teak plantations (Table 2) . A formal proposal is being prepared for submission to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) for the bioenergy project. The bioenergy project is expected to offset coal-based electricity production and its associated carbon emissions. The Tamarind Orchards project (Table 2 ) (Ravindranath et al., 1998b ) would grow tamarind trees, which are highly valued for fruit (and thus unlikely to be abandoned once the JI/AIJ project is over). It was favorably reviewed on its technical merits by USIJI and the task force of the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests, and is currently in the process of being reviewed for acceptance by both governments. The Teak Plantation project is intended to grow high-value teak, of which there is a shortage. The rural benefits of each project are tangible and likely to make a significant contribution to the welfare of local communities ( Table 2 ). The three AIJ case studies for India are already on the list of development activities defined by the Indian Planning Commission. Thus, they have already been determined to be consistent with national development goals.
Mexico
Of the four countries represented in this volume, Mexico has most actively explored AIJ. We report on three of these projects below (Table 2) . One project, Ilumex, is tided by the GEF, and by Norway as an AIJ project. Ilumex substitutes efficient compact fluorescent bulbs (CFLS)
for incandescent light bulbs (DeBuen and Masera, 1994 , Sathaye et al., 1992 , Vargas, 1996 . The project was originally initiated by Mexico's national electric utility company (CFE) and received fimding through the World Bank. The project also received fimding from the Norwegian government. Ilumex will reduce local air pollutant emissions, create urban manufacturing jobs and will save electricity costs to consumers ( (Dunn, 1997) and (2) an agroforestry project in Chiapas (Tipper, Taylor and de Jong, 1996) , (3) Oaxaca Community Forestry Project and (4) Baja Renewable Energy Mini-Grid
Project. The halophyte plantation products could be used for making particle board, cooking oil, and possibly an oil additive for diesel fiel. However, only the soil carbon benefits of the current small-scale pilot version of this project are being claimed by the developer, which is small ( Table   2 ). The Chiapas agroforestry project will increase local farmer's income and reduce deforestation.
South Africa
Several transport and housing efficiency projects from South Africa, including the EcoHousing Efficiency Project listed in Table 2 , have been submitted for USIJI consideration. The housing efficiency project was approved by USIJI in June 1998. Van Horen, Simmonds, and Parker (1998) examine two case studies of potential U projects: (1) a CFL lighting project in the service area of the major utility company, ESKOM, and (2) a passive solar energy-ei%cient housing project in a low-income township. In the fist case, the utility pkms to replace 1.25 million incandescent bulbs with CFLS during a five-year period. Because ESKOM's primary fiel source for generating electricity is coal, such a reduction in electricity demand could decrease carbon emissions by up to 244,000 million tonnes of carbon. The CFL lighting project has been accepted as a GEF project. The second case study, the low-income thermal efficient housing project, was approved by the USIJI program in June 1998. The project developer plans to deliver 6,000 energy efficient homes at a cost of US $425 per house above the government subsidy for new housing construction. The project is expected to save between 40 and 50 thousand tonnes of carbon dioxide over its 50-year life. The large majority of the homes currently being built under the government subsidy program have no thermal insulation and lack efllcient features such as light bulbs and cook stoves, doing nothing to address the already grave problems with indoor air pollution and fatal cooking fires.
3.2
Discussion of Technical and Other Concerns
Investigators contributing papers to the current collection have examined 12 ongoing and potential JI/AIJ projects to determine whether the concerns identified in Table 1 below are valid.
The answer is that a majority of concerns were addressed by the project developers or were not critically important, with the exceptions of additionality of fimds, guarantees of performance and host country institutions. The key findings from the case studies in each paper are summarized in relation to the technical issues and other concerns identified below. Some issues were more important to some countries than to others, so not every country is included in the summary of concerns for each issue.
Technical Concerns Transfer ofobsolete andor high-cost technology
The transfer of obsolete technology was not considered a major issue for any of the projects analyzed by the authors. In most cases it was not applicable because the technology was indigenous, and in others it was thought to be of minor importance since practices, and not hardware, were being transferred. This could become a concern if projects are done on a large scale with inadequate attention to this issue.
In one (Salicornia, Mexico) of the 12 case studies, high cost of technology was observed to be an important barrier. In other cases, either this was not an issue, e.g., Tamarind Orchards, Indi~or project implementers had found ways to overcome it, e.g., the Ilurnex project in Mexico.
On the issue of transfer of obsolete technology, the Indian authors point out that the FCCC AIJ guidelines clearly suggest a global process for acquiring technology, which, if properly implemented, would make transfer of obsolete technology difficult. Dumping of old or inappropriate technology, for example poorly manufactured CFLS, on a recipient country could set an AIJ program back many years. Consumer acceptance of the technology could be negatively affected if poor-quality products were offered, which would not be in the interests of an investor hoping to build a profitable long-term market for these products in the recipient country. In Mexico, CFLS are being manufactured in the country to specifications more stringent than the ones for industrialized countries in order to withstand the poorer quality of electricity supply. Imaz et al. (1998) 
Negative local impacts
Eight of the 12 projects identified no negative local impacts. Indeed, in several cases the project would have a positive impact by reducing local air pollution andlor creating jobs in rural areas.
For the other projects, the main impact is related to the displacement of local dwellers that a forest protection project might cause, or an increase in environmental impacts, e.g., from charcoal use or the production of ethanol in Brazil. For the India teak plantation project, the concern is that widespread planting may lead to cultivation of monoculture, which would be susceptible to pest infestation leading to loss of timber and the release of sequestered carbon.
Although international investors may not be fhlly aware of the local benefits of JI/AIJ projects, the three Indian case studies show that local benefits are unlikely to be ignored. If projects rely on government or community land, the local community's awareness will be key to ensuring sensitivity to local needs. The biomass projects described for India involve planting trees on farmers' private lands; farmers are unlikely to participate in a project unless they are convinced of its benefits. Each of the Mexican projects reviewed will have strong local benefits. The forestry project in Chiapas and halophyte fhrming in Sonora are expected to provide local employment and reduce migration of rural residents to urban areas as well as create positive environmental benefits through watershed management and improved control of soil erosion.
Both projects will add to rural incomes, and developers have taken steps to ensure that benefits continue after project completion. However, an issue that remains unclear is whether the projects will become part of the lives of the local communities and will be sustained after the developers leave.
Additionality offunds and avoidance of GHG emissions
Additionality of fimds was not reported to be an issue for half the projects analyzed by the authors. In some of the other cases, additionality of fimds may be difficult to establish. For Mexico, the authors use the Chiapas forestry project to demonstrate the difficulty of determining whether fi.mding is truly additional; overseas development funds from the United Kingdom, which were not clearly additional, were used to do feasibility research for the project. However, project implementation is to be supported by the Federation International de L'Automobile (FIA), whose funds are considered additional. La Revere (1998) cites an example from Brazil regarding the difficulty of assuring true additionality of JI/AIJ tiding; he offers a rather dismal description of the whittling down of several hundred million dollars of aid promised by G-7 countries through the GEF and other donors. The promised sum was eventually reduced to a fraction of the original commitment. If JI/AIJ monies were forthcoming for the programs originally targeted by the G-7 monies, the JUAIJ funding could be seen as simply fidfilling previously broken promises of aid rather than supplying truly additional support. In the case of South Africa's potential CFL AIJ project, the electric utility company, ESKOM, has the fimds and is willing to take a risk with the CFL program. ESKOM would most likely target consumers with higher income where the potential for savings is likely to be high because of their higher electricity consumption. Thus, unless a JI/AIJ investor targeted low-tariff electricity customers, which may not be served by the ESKOM program, the funds for this project would not be additional. For South Afi-ica's housing project, the additional support is clear, in the form of technical assistance with no directly proposed transfer of funds.
The concern about setting appropriate baselines to describe the growth of GHG emissions in the absence of an AIJ project is important to investor entities and countries. Investors and governments are concerned about baselines in order to ensure that GHG reductions or carbon sequestration achieved by a JI/AIJ project are above and beyond the GHG emissions reductions that would have occurred even without one.
The papers from Brazil and Mexico allude to the difficulty in establishing baselines. La Revere (1998) suggests removing Brazilian forest protection projects from consideration as AIJ/JI projects. For each of the three Mexican projects, projected reductions of GHG emissions were established through analysis of available data. For Ilumex, however, many questions remain about the assumptions that were used in preparing the baselines, and about whether utility GHG emissions could be accurately monitored. A recent paper suggests that coal-fired generation would be displaced, but it is not clear how a lighting project that saves electricity on-peak would displace coal which fuels base-load generation (Quintanilla, 1997) .
For the three India projects, establishing baselines was easier since degraded lands or rainfed marginal croplands constituted the areas considered for planting teak, tamarind or bioenergy plantations. The baseline included minimal carbon sequestration on such areas. The teak from plantations is likely to substitute for imported teak whose origins are difficult to trace. If the imported teak is derived from virgin forests, then the plantation teak would offset the emissions from the unsustainable harvested teak trees. The bioenergy project would offset electricity generated by coal or diesel fired units and thus displace their associated carbon emissions.
Injlastructure for project formulation, evaluation and monitoring, and government acceptance
The following discussion of this topic covers two separate issues. One related to the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of projects for which technical capacity is lacking in the study countries, and the second related to the process of government acceptance of AIJ projects, which has been established to more or less degree in India, Mexico and South Africa. Like many other Until recently, there was no government process for acceptance of AIJ projects in India. The
Indian authors had stated that it would have been in the country's interest to devise such a process, in view of the considerable economic and social benefits of biomass projects in Indiã side from their global GHG emissions benefits. Methods for assessment of GHG reduction need refining in South Afric~more detailed data collection and analysis are needed to assure that a CFL program would displace coal-freed rather than gas-fwed or hydro-based power generation.
Similarly, for the South African housing project, assessment methods are needed to monitor and veri~energy and carbon savings.
In Mexico, the evaluation and monitoring of the performance of the three case studies analyzed by the authors was not seen to be a problem. In each case, the projects had adequate monitoring and evaluation plans and technical experts were available to conduct these activities. The
Mexican authors also noted that the quality of the many proposals submitted for AIJ projects reveals that the preparers lacked basic understanding of(1) JI/AIJ and (2) methods of estimating GHG reduction compared to a baseline. In addition, as in the other three countries, Mexican institutions need to be designated and their staff trained for monitoring and evaluating project proposals and performance. Mexico does not have a Ml-fledged process for accepting proposals at the moment although general guidelines have been issued for a voluntary AIJ process overseen by a temporary committee. Although Imaz et al., 1998 suggest that much of the monitoring could be done by project developers. They suggest that Mexico should also have trained outside auditors to assess whether the carbon credits that are ultimately shared reflect each project's actual pefiormance.
Leakage andpermanence
These are valid concerns for most of the projects. In forest protection projects particularly, it is conceivable that dwellers who are prevented from deforesting a protected area could migrate elsewhere in neighboring forests and continue their past livelihood, which required the felling or burning of trees. The question of permanence is also worrisome since in all types of forestry projects, the benefits of carbon sequestered may be lost after some years if there is a change in land use and the pkmted trees have to be removed. In principle, this loss of carbon should be treated as a "debit" against any carbon credit that might have been claimed for the project.
The leakage issue is relevant to protection projects in the Amazon. LaRovere instance, argues that these two issues are reasons why forest protection projects quali~as candidates for AIJ/JL On the other hand, in two of the India projects, there (1998), for
should not is reason to believe that permanence will not bean issue. In the India Tamarind Project, the tamarind fruit is highly valued, and there is a cukural tradition of not felling these trees for decades, if ever. In the case of the India Bioenergy Project, the generation and use of bioelectricity will permanently secure the carbon saved from not burning fossil fuel to generate electricity. In the third project, the teak trees could potentially be destroyed to make way for other land uses, but continued high demand for teak may prevent this fi-om happening.
The involvement of local groups who receive direct monetary or other benefits as illustrated in In&la and Mexico case studies will be important to ensure sustenance, and replicability of projects. Indeed, the main role of associated benefits in forestry projects for carbon mitigation would be to secure the permanence of carbon sequestered in such projects. The creation of rural jobs and income, soil conservation and watershed enhancement, if sustained, will be a strong reason for local farmers to maintain these projects. In South Africa, where the local utility company ESKOM is the sole implementer of the CFL project, it would be easier to ensure project sustenance provided ESKOM views the benefits to be adequate.
Sharing carbon credits
On the issue of sharing carbon credits, Imaz et al., 1998 agree with Ravindranath, et al., 1998a that carbon credit sharing is essential to unlocking the flow of investment fimds for JI projects. Imaz et al., 1998 suggest that Mexico needs to develop a strong framework, either through bilateral agreement or through a tradable-offsets mechanism. These observations are consistent with the use of certified emissions reductions by Annex I parties as suggested in the Kyoto protocol. For the South Africa CFL case, the authors explore three different formulas for sharing carbon credits among investor and recipient countries. One approach would be to use a percentage of initial investment by each country, a second would be for South Africa to set a standard percentage for all projects, and a third would be to base the percentage on the avoided costs in the investor country. In the case of the EcoHousing project in South Africa, the participants have devised an arrangement for sharing, whereby the local community gets 45%, investors get 45°/0, and the international facilitating agency receives 10°/0of the credits. 1
Macroeconomic impacts
Except in three cases, macroeconomic impacts were considered to be of importance. In four cases these were deemed to be of major importance since expansion of projects or programs, An earlier study by Ravindranath and Kadekodi (1997) shows that carbon sequestration projects in India could triple the output value of forest products thus increasing forestry's contribution to GDP by 50%, add 67'%0 to employment in the sector, and reverse the forest products trade flow in 
Other Issues
In addition to the technical project-specific issues addressed by each author, the authors also made several observations and comments that are noted below.
The importance of emissions caps
La Revere (1 998) suggests that it is important for all countries to commit to GHG emissions caps in order to keep global GHG emissions from continuing to increase despite JI/AIJ projects. proposes that a time period be allowed for developing countries to reach caps once they agree to take on commitments. In addition, La Revere (1998) and Imaz et al. (1998) feel strongly that Annex I countries should be limited in the percentage of their emissions that could be offset by credits from JI/AIJ projects. Without such a limit, they argue, Annex I countries will be slow to develop innovative GHG-reduction technologies, which will in turn slow the transfer of these technologies to developing countries. A limit would also help allay non-Annex I countries' concerns since it will confine the amount of inexpensive GHG emissions reductions options that foreign investors will be able to access through JI/AIJ projects. Ravindranath et al. (1998a) stress that the AIJ pilot phase is too short for a fill evaluation of some projects, such as biomass projects, which have long gestation periods. Afforestation or reforestation projects typically exhibit a noticeable increase in above-ground biomass only after five years or so for most tree species. The AIJ pilot phase is anticipated to end in 2000 after a period of about five years, which is too shofi to ascertain the carbon benefit of a project. The authors thus call for extending the AIJ pilot phase beyond the year 2000 for biomass projects. At a minimum, the monitoring and evaluation phase should be extended several years beyond a project's completion estimates.
Time horizon ofAIJ
Summary
date to ensure that the sequestered amount of carbon matches the ex-aizte
The 12 studies from four countries presented here recognize jointly implemented climate change projects as a promising alternative to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. Many technical concerns about JI/AIJ are being realistically and sensibly addressed in the projects and programs examined as case studies in this report. The transfer of obsolete technology was not considered a major issue for instance and eight of the studies identified positive local impacts. The case studies illustrate that JI/AIJ projects have the potential to bring new technology, investment, employment, and other ancillary socioeconomic and environmental benefits to developing countries. These benefits are consistent with the goal of sustainable development in the four study countries. It is, however, important to guard against inequitable distribution of the benefits from such projects.
The case studies illustrate the differences between forestry and energy projects. Both types of projects have benefits associated with them. The forestry projects bring rural jobs and incomes, reduce soil erosion and rehabilitate degraded kinds. The energy projects provide urban or manufacturing jobs, bring better energy technology, and reduce local air pollutants. Both types of projects can reduce a country's import bill if implemented widely. There is concern about the permanence of the stored carbon for forestation projects and about leakage of carbon benefits for protection projects. The former can be minimized if projects focus on tree species that are highly valued by local populations, and provide them with socioeconomic benefits.
Key issues identified where further effort is still needed include: additionality of funds, guarantees of performance (including the establishment of baselines and the risk of leakage) and 20 host country institutions to evaluate and monitor projects. They also note that clear international and national guidelines to address issues such as carbon sharing, monitoring and verification, etc.
are key for a sound JI/AIJ system. Clear guidelines will also avoid that official development assistance would be channeled away from other deserving causes. All the papers agree on the need to develop institutional arrangements for approving and monitoring JI/AIJ projects in each of the countries represented. The studies' authors note the importance of(1) Annex I couhtries to limit the use of JI/AIJ as a way to get credits against their own emissions at home, and (2) industrialized countries developing new technologies that will benefit all countries. The authors also observe that if all countries accepted caps on their emissions (with a longer time period allowed for developing countries to do so) project-based GHG mitigation would be significantly facilitated by the improved private-investment climate.
